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Was the Keynesian message alive during the second half of the XXth Century, or was it betrayed by his followers? This article in the fields of the history of economic thought and methodology contrasts the Scientific Research Programmes (SRPs), a Lakatosian concept, of Keynes in The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (TGT) with those of its immediate orthodox schools: Monetarism (MS), Neoclassical Synthesis (NS), New Classical Macroeconomics – rational expectations – (RE) and General Disequilibrium (GD). The objective is to to assess the immediate impact of Keynes’s vision in economics. 

It can be concluded according to this comparison that Keynes’s bequeath was alive during the period between 1950 and 1980, but that it was accepted under different names. Many economists deny this statement. However it is hereby argued with the help of Lakatosian methodology that in both economic and philosophical terms the MS, NS, RE and GD SRPs are degenerative variants of Keynes's SRP. The Keynesian reasoning chain -a non self-regulated system, non neutrality on the part of money, organicism, non-ergodicity, historical time and uncertainty- is misunderstood and hence misapplied on the part of these deviant schools, or transformed into “bastard Keynesianism”, to quote Joan Robinson (Joan Robinson, 1975[1973], 125). In other words, Keynes’s economics is different from Keynesian economics as was firstly proposed by Axel Leijonhuvfud (Leijonhuvfud, 1968). The internal history of macroeconomics in those periods is undertaken, since it is is the rational reconstruction of the meaning of a SRP.

Section 1 is an introduction to basic concepts related to philosophy of science and methodology, especially Lakatosian methodology, which can be skipped by the specialized reader. Section 2 is an analysis of Keynes’s hard core in his SRP, also being an introduction to the problem as it outlines Keynes’s thinking, Section 3 describes initial Post Keynesianism, which was faithful to the original message. Sections 4, 5, 6 and 7 outline the hard cores of Monetarists, Neoclassical Synthesis, New Classical Macroeconomics and General Disequilibrium, respectively. Section 8 is a comprehensive analysis of the differences between the mentioned paradigms, and hence concludes. References are listed at the end of the article.
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I. Basic concepts of philosophy & economics
Science is clear, objective, rational, real, legal, systematic, useful, verifiable, and capable of being communicated knowledge about a field (Bunge, 1989). Verifiable means that it must be empirically tested vis-à-vis reality. As this test of knowledge may imply a rejection, knowledge possesses a dynamic character (Chalmers, 1999).

The goals of science are both explanation and prediction (Machlup, 1978). Both apriorism and ultraempiricism are extreme strands in epistemology. According to apriorism, the categorization of processes is the most relevant constituent of knowledge. According to ultraempiricism, both hypotheses and problem identification depart from observation. The distinction between these two approaches will contribute to the methodological assessment of the perspectives from which hypothesis formulation arises in the case of Keynes’s macroeconomics and his competing schools.

Methodology is the “study of logical principles useful for determining if certain proposals are accepted or rejected as valid constituents of the structure of scientific knowledge” (Machlup, 1978, 490). Methodology and Philosophy of Science are thus relevant as the dismal science has experienced several challenges in terms of its structure and object of study, regarding its scientific status. External voices must be heeded. Karl Popper, perhaps the most outstanding philosopher of science during the last century, is an advocate of falsificationism, in which a theory must be continuously tested and discarded at least partially in the event of not being able to stand refutations. Hence, falsificationism may be the main determinant of progress in science and in economics and it is the best demarcation criterion for the assessment of theories.

According to Popper a theory is only scientific (and valid) if it can be falsified. If it makes inaccurate predictions and provides a way of covering explaining those inaccuracies, then it is not falsifiable and is pseudo-science.

Lakatos and Scientific Research Programmes
Falsificationism possesses many virtues. According to Chalmers (1999) it is necessary to examine the treatment of theories as structures. Taking into account these explanations about the nature of science and after reading economists trained in methodology such as Blaug or Hutchinson, it can be stated that the underlying organizing principle of theories is the interrelation of systems. For this purpose, the epistemological theories of two of Popper’s successors are considered: Thomas Kuhn who proposes a methodology of paradigms (Kuhn, 1970), whereas Lakatos suggests that of Scientific Research Programmes or SRPs (Lakatos, 1978).

Paradigms are organizing world views or approaches to scientific thought in terms of identified problems and prevailing standardized systemic solutions. In contrast, SRPs analyze interrelated theories in terms of their gradual progress. The Lakatosian methodology is hereby chosen since continuity and validity in the Keynesian SRP are assessed. SRPs are also explicit criteria for the detailed comparison of theories.

The first essential component of SRPs is the hard core, which is not subject to falsificationism by methodological principle. The second element is positive or negative heuristics or guidelines for the implementation of theories to be used throughout the research. They are written in terms of suggestions about the use of theories. The third constituent is the protective belt, which comprises the auxiliary assumptions of theories, which vary with respect to either time or place and are often expressed as parameters.

SRPs are either progressive or degenerative according to the success in the replacement of their constituents, particularly those of the core. Thus SRPs must be chosen depending on their new theoretical or empirical prescriptions. In turn, the substitution of some heuristic instruments signifies that the essence of that theory has not been modified at all. Finally, the replacement of a protective belt only widens the extent of application of that theory, sometimes in an artificial manner.

The internal history of science is the rational reconstruction of the meaning of a SRP. The external history of science is the description of empirical facts within a field of research. Both consistency and refutation are the main criteria for accepting an SRP (Blaug, 1980).

If differences between two schools arise simply from their cores, both schools are independent SRPs. If the differentiation arises primarily from specific parts of their cores, both schools are independent sub-SRPs. If deviations from an original SRP on the part of any school do not stem from their cores, these schools are only scientific movements shifting away from the original SRP. Bearing these concepts in mind, the structure of the Keynes’s SRP is now identified.

It can thus be stated that the methodology of economics has long been dominated by Karl Popper and Imre Lakatos since the 1950s. Accordingly, this article focuses on the application of Lakatosian principles of appraisal to special theories since methodology allows the measurement of progress in science.

A Note on Falsificationism
Falsificationism however, reveals some limitations in examining theories in isolation. This is due to both observations and results involve numerous assumptions that do not necessarily belong to isolated theories, but may arise from related theories in their fields or in other disciplines. Theories are only a part of their contexts. These assessments are mainly based on the Duhem–Quine thesis, also known as “the under-determination argument”. If theoretical systems involve numerous assumptions that do not necessarily belong to isolated theories, the Duhem-Quine Thesis creates doubts about Popper's falsificationist methodology. In this view Falsificationism is not a conclusive philosophy, and it has an impact on scientific knowledge.

The problem is that if an empirical test of the hypothesis requires one or more auxiliary assumptions or hypotheses, the hypothesis in question is by itself incapable of making predictions. This prevents a theory from becoming conclusively falsified in empirical terms if its assumptions are not proven. Quine contemplated the entirety of human knowledge as being one unit of empirical significance. Nevertheless Duhem's conception has its own limits, since it states that not all concepts are connected to each other logically. This may be a weakness since Instrumentalism claims that scientific theories are merely useful tools for predicting phenomena instead of true descriptions of the physical world.

One solution to this dilemma is that when one has rational reasons to accept the background assumptions as true, one will have rational -albeit non-conclusive- reasons for thinking that the theory tested is probably wrong if the empirical test fails. Hence Falsificationism and SRPs are hereby used for studying Keynes’s school and its immediate orthodoxy in methodological terms.

2. Keynes’s Scientific Research Programme
Keynes’s work rejects the Classical core -Laissez Faire, the Invisible Hand, the atomistic view of the economy, the existence of a natural order, a self-regulating system and a new “old” perception of full employment. 

Keynes’s research was based on the consideration of aggregate variables. In The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (TGT) the determination of aggregate output and, as a consequence, of involuntary unemployment, was his scientific and practical concern. The novelty was that aggregate demand is the determining factor of national income (Y), by means of effective demand and the consideration of investment as the volatile factor.

Keynes also had a different view of money as a store of value and used this view to link the real and the monetary sectors (Klein, 1947). Thus, he is considered to be the founder of macroeconomics. Other related revolutionary concepts initiated by Keynes were: the ineffectiveness of price flexibility to cure unemployment; the irrelevance of wages as an equilibrating factor of the system (Chapter 18 of TGT); the introduction of uncertainty as a key element (Skidelsky, 2000; O’Donnell, 1991), as it generates instability in investment (I) and expectations; and the potential inequality between savings and investment (Heilbroner, 1951).

Other elements are the marginal efficiency of investment which breaks Say’s Law (reversing the savings-investment classical causation) and the replacement of the Quantity Theory of Money with the liquidity preference approach. His most relevant practical contribution refers to the possibility of using fiscal and monetary policy to increase output and employment. These concepts are the response to the lack of self-regulation mechanisms in the system to achieve full employment.

Keynes’s issues can thus be classified as theoretical, empirical and policy related, wherein Keynes’s concepts are related to his philosophical vision. These issues are divided into the constituents of an SRP in Table 1.

Table 1 Keynes’s SRP

Core	Positive heuristics	Protective belt
A different concept of men. Men are not always rational. ‘Animal spirits’ exist	Intuition and conjectures are important	Use the principle of effective demand (demand> supply. An unstable demand exists.	Study involuntary unemployment, alongside voluntary and frictional unemployment.	A high and relatively constant propensity to consume > .9.
Market-clearing equilibrium is a special case, subequilibria are permanent.	Piece meal arrangements.	Consider the pivotal role of investment in the fluctuations of aggregate demand.	Consider that saving and investment result from different behaviours, thus, could be unequal.	Intermediate conditions prevail in economic life.
The comparative statics method is used. Assumptions are relevant.	Irreversibility exist alongside a unique world (non-repetitious). 	Analyze the consumption function in aggregate terms.	Analyse:C = f(Y)I = f(r)Md = f(Y)Ms = given, where:Y = C+I+G+X-IMMd = MsLD = LS.	The quantity theory of money is a special case of reality. MS is given.
Uncertainty and irrationality, imperfect information.	Macroeconomics studies the determination of income and employment.	Consider the ‘finance motive’.	Take into account uncertainty as having a large impact on investment via expectations.	Refutation of  Say’s law (supply generates its own demand).
Money is not a veil, it is non neutral.	Dynamic role of the public sector.	Emphasize the quantificationof aggregate variables.	Study decision making processes under uncertainty.	Idle economies.
Observation of facts.	The fallacy of composition exists (Organicism).	Emphasize not price but  quantity adjustments.		Sticky wages.
The present is relevant.	Both the actual being and the perception of the world matter.	Study liquidity preference.		Liquidity trap.
The short term is more relevant than the long term.		Divide the economy into markets: products, labour and money.		Fixed exchange rates (ê).
				No auctioneer exists.

Perhaps the most remarkable concept of TGT is that the economic system lacks a self-adjustment mechanism for returning to full employment after a shock. For dissenting views on the importance of Keynes as contrasted with the continual relevance of the Classical message see for instance Ahiakpor, 1998.

Explaining Keynes’s Hard Core
Keynes borrows some philosophical concepts from G. E. Moore (an anti-utilitarian and realistic philosopher) as well as from some philosophers of science such as David Hume and John Neville Keynes amongst others, developing an original theory with some elements taken from the Cambridge economist Alfred Marshall (Skidelsky, 2000).

Keynes’s vision was rediscovered during both the late 1980s and 1990s as his rhetorical style (vitalizing language) and interpretations as well as his philosophy (mainly methodology and ethics) began to interest most scholars, such as Blaug (1978, 2002), Skidelsky (2000), Carabelli (1988), O’Donnell (1991), Gerrard (1994) and Dow (2002). This is a small sample of interpretations made on Keynes’s work from the perspective of philosophy. 

Keynes’s System, Definitions, Objectives and Means
The study of the main works of Keynes allows the historian of economic thought to capture the core of his theory in the following statements. As the economic system does not self-regulate and full employment equilibrium is only a special case, involuntary unemployment exists. Consequently the purpose of macroeconomics is to minimize variations in activity by focusing on stagnation and unemployment in order to lead the system to equilibrium (even inflation can be cured on the opposite side of the coin). The State must lead and stabilize activity, enhancing private initiative, by means of the implementation of policies.

Macroeconomics explains the theory of value by means of short-term underemployment equilibria. The means for the attainment of such objectives are the determination of national income (Y) and full employment, in the short term. Aggregate demand (AD) is the dynamic element underlying Y –and employment (N), and investment is the fluctuating element in AD due to the inherent irrationality of entrepreneurs. Hence, full employment is the heuristic goal of macroeconomics. In this type of economic system, both money and labor markets acquire a special role due to the existence of interest rates and wage breaks.

Finally, Keynes states that once the said macroeconomic objective is achieved, the objectives of the Classical theory must be attained: efficient allocation of resources, optimization of utility and profits under a framework of freedom.

Keynes’s Methodology
John Neville Keynes thought that economics was a branch of logic and Maynard inherited this view. In addition, economics is both positive and normative, being a social science with objectives, characteristics and elements. In terms of epistemology, John Maynard Keynes relies on intuition, convention and dynamic observation (see O’Donnell or Fitzgibbons). Economics is also considered as a moral science. He is a realist in the sense that his analysis creates real rather than ideal, abstract or logical explanations (see Lwason). The result is that his analysis obtains a dynamic, organized and rational method to analyze and solve concrete problems rather than providing general answers. In quantitative terms, economics is a science of trends.

As a successor of Marshall, the construction and interpretation of comparative statics models are Keynes’s means to explain practical problems. On the other hand, his method is both inductive, when reaching categorical judgments from initial observations and facts contrasting, and deductive when constructing models. The steps in model construction are: initial observation of facts, creation of the model and final facts contrast vis-á-vis reality. For Keynes, facts established in other fields may be constituents of economic analysis.

Further, his theories are full of innovative concepts such as “uncertainty”, “ignorance” and “dispersed knowledge”. A special place in Keynes’s methodology belongs to organicism (O’Donnell, 1991) or what used to be called the “fallacy of composition”. The whole is different from the sum of its parts, since the interrelations among the elements of the system are not linear but complex and multidirectional. This allows him to differentiate macro from microeconomics. Finally, Keynes also uses the concept of historical time as opposed to Adam Smith’s logical time (cf. Robinson, especially Robinson, 1975).

Keynes’s Institutions
Keynes was an evolutionist rather than a social revolutionary. For him, free competition must be preserved as well as property rights. Notwithstanding, he is also an innovator when stating that the State will lead economic activity without the need to change during the process inherent elements to human nature, such as psychological and economic motivations. 

For Keynes the received institutional framework is defined by race, conventions, political organization, religious and moral standards, individual and social experiences and technology (Keynes, 1936). In contrast money Keynes has a new concept of money. It is at the centre of his institutions, as monetary factors influence real variables, unlike Classical theory. In fact, money connects the real and the monetary systems via investment. Money links the present with the future generating uncertainty which is reflected on interest rates and differential wages, which in turn have a major impact on investors.

Keynes’s Behaviour of Economic and Political Agents
Keynes breaks the Classical core given that in his vision there is also heterogeneity in behaviours; that is, economic unities and economic structures do not necessarily work in a co-ordinate fashion in terms of laissez faire-laissez passer.

The explanations for this anomaly are: 1) market-structure typology (free competition vs. state intervention); 2) market asymmetry (flexible vs. sticky prices) and 3) variable asymmetry (flexible vs. rigid). The explanation for uncertainty is the existent dichotomy in behavior in terms of computations and expectations, where there are both irrational (no homus economicus) agents (investors) as well as rational agents (consumers and government). Investors are not necessarily deterministic, efficient or objective, which impinges on the unavailability of perfect information. In truth, independent (but interrelated) decision making should exist in an organicist system. This is human nature.

According to Keynes the consequences of uncertainty are autonomy of future events with respect to the past, heterogeneity of criteria and the consideration of historical time in decision making. Further, the impact of actions is immediate rather than lagged. Non-ergodicity exists in behavior, which means that there is so such a thing as repetition of events (cf. Davidson, 1987). Small events have a large impact. 

3. Initial Orthodox Post Keynesianism, and Immediate Orthodoxy
Before analyzing the hard cores of the immediate orthodox schools, the initial Orthodox Post Keynesianism and Neo Keynesianism are described, although not in Lakatosian terms as they do not break Keynes’s core. The initial representatives of Keynesianism were the Keynes’s Circus in the late 1930s and the 1940s, and the Cambridge Approach. The Keynes’s Circus (United Kingdom) ignited the Keynesian Revolution and was formed by Joan and Austin Robinson and Richard Kahn, amongst other economists. The Cambridge Approach, which has an ongoing heterodox program, is comprised by the original macroeconomic vision of Keynes; the distributional and comprehensive emphasis of Kalecki; and the value theory of Sraffa. This approach was subsequently followed by both the Neo Ricardians (Italy, United Kingdom) and the Heterodox Post Keynesian Schools (United States, United Kingdom). See Map 1.

Map 1 The Keynesian Revolution and Orthodoxy
Keynes  The Keynes’s Circus

Neo Keynesianism or Neo Classical-Keynesian 		Cambridge Keynesians (UK),
Synthesis, dominating in the 50s and the 60s 		(Keynes’s Circus, Robinson)
in both the US and the UK (Hicks, 1937)		
                           	
			Orthodox Post Keynesian Revolution (US), 
 Neo Classical Synthesis   
                
Monetarists 

New Classical Macroeconomics 

General Disequilibrium.
Source: Based on the History of Economic Thought Website, J. M. Keynes and The Neokeynesian World, 2004.

The Keynes Circus distinguished itself by a high degree of faithfulness to Keynes. Orthodoxy was the next step in Keynesianism, especially since the 1950s but its roots appeared after 1936. Indeed there were several important developments in Immediate Orthodox Post Keynesianism. The crucial developments were the invention of the Keynesian Cross (the income-expenditure model) by Samuelson and the IS-LM representation of Keynes's theory by John Hicks (1937). The latter had a deep impact in both theory and policy management. It also provided a useful pedagogical device to popularize the Keynesian Revolution, as this term is understood by Klein (1947), for instance.

Immediate Orthodox Schools
To put these insights in context, the schools of modern macroeconomics are (1) Orthodox Keynesianism, (2) Monetarism, (3) New Classical Macroeconomics, (4) Real Business Cycle Theory, (5) New Keynesian Economics, (6) Austrian, and (7) Post Keynesian Economics, according to Snowdon et al. (1994). Returning to the Keynesian revolution, Neo Keynesians only hold on to John Maynard Keynes's theory, so that there is no need to conduct an exercise of their SRPs. 
As stated previously Neo Keynesianism soon became the core of the initial orthodox Post Keynesianism. By treating a subset of Keynes's theory as a system of simultaneous equations, the IS-LM model was also the beginning of the Neo Classical Synthesis, the dominant form of Keynesianism, especially in the United States between the 1950s and the 1960s​[2]​. 

Another influential rival of Keynes is the Monetarist School, which dominated the scene in the late 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. Others were the New Classical Macroeconomics School -with similar assumptions and results to those of Monetarists-, and that of General Disequilibrium, which were also relevant in the 1960s and the 1970s. In any event, TGT launched a revolution in knowledge and generated myriads of followers. In this context, the Lakatosian analyses of the four main macroeconomics Orthodox Post-Keynesian schools: Neoclassical Synthesis, Monetarism, General Disequilibrium and New Classical Macroeconomics are hereby subsequently conducted, under the falsifiable assumption that they depart from Keynes to inaugurate the initial Orthodox Post Keynesianism.

The orthodox Keynesians, monetarists, new classical macroeconomists and general disequilibrium theorists are selected here considering as criteria: 1) their periods of boom because these schools are the immediate outcome of the TGT up to the 1980s, and 2) their extreme deviations from original Keynes’s economics.​[3]​ 

These insights about the strand composed by the four chosen schools are the subject matter of this paper since they have relevant philosophical foundations and practical implications, as the analyses of their hard cores will soon reveal.

4. The hard core of the Monetarist School
Outstanding members of the Monetarist School (MS) are Milton Friedman, Philip Cagan, Friedrich Hayek (though he also pertains to the Austrian school) and Harry Johnson. It was initiated during the 1960s while its heyday was during the 1970s and the 1980s. It is nonetheless still highly influential, especially regarding method and its specific -monetary and policy- insights.

Monetarist System, Definitions, Objectives and Means
Nature and society possess a self-regulating Cartesian mechanism. Actually for them, the free-market system achieves the economic objectives, an insight which is related to an atomistic vision of economic agents. Whereas the objective of the analysis is the same as that for Keynes, for Monetarists fluctuations in activity are exceptional and always “caused” by monetary disturbances.

Whereas the main elements of the monetarist analysis are the ones exposed and proposed by Keynes, both objective and independent variables along with social parameters, its fundamental assumption is different. Monetarists think of the existence of a single long-term natural equilibrium in the context of neutral money with exceptional deviations. 

Hence the difference between monetarists and Keynes lays in the standpoint on self-regulation. In the former, the price system signals information about activities, enhances efficiency and automatically determines income distribution. Money supply (MS) is the relevant instrumental variable in the determination and analysis of AD along with inflation (), which is one of their major concerns. For Keynes prices are an insufficient indicator mechanism, investment is the key objective variable and interest rates are the instrumental variable.

Monetarist Methodology
The analysis disentangles positive from normative economics, providing a new methodological basis: a system of empirical relations as portrayed in historical data sometimes lacking an explanation. This is due to the fact that monetarists relate economic variables rather than explain economic activity; its essence is beyond their purpose. Other epistemological stances are instrumentalism and methodological nominalism, the latter coming from Ockam and Hume. For them knowledge is based on the concept of logical time and events are considered as ergodic or rooted in the past. On the other hand the analysis is eclectic, but its theories and objectives differ from those of Keynes, as its departure point is that disequilibria are exceptional, simple and easily identifiable.

As a consequence, its objective is to propose new and consistent solutions, founded on partial extreme realism, wherein generalizations must predict changes and protective-belt assumptions are irrelevant (cf. Friedman, 1953). Thus its logic of theory valuation is falsificationism. This means in this context that the steps for the elaboration of hypotheses are construction and validation, in which a continuous test of hypotheses against experience is necessary. Finally, the analysis closes the gap between theory and reality while blending micro and macroeconomic explanations due to its atomistic (Classical or Walrasian) interpretation of the world.

Monetarist Institutions
This is a different world from that of 1936. Both entrepreneurs and consumers are rational whereas the State has a poor record on problem resolution (cf. Friedman, 1980). In other words, private actions are almighty and the State must be limited to conduct a surveillance of private actions. State interventions do not fulfill the efficiency criterion. Thus, interventions are rejected on their spirit and implications. In addition, property rights and institutions must be respected. Summarizing, Monetarism is based on political conservationism and Laissez Faire. This world is not aristocratic, but an egalitarian economy.

These insights are related to the consideration that the system possesses a Leibnizian pre-established harmony, wherein only in specific circumstances do monetary variables “impact” real variables. Money must arise from activity rather than be created by the State. Like in Keynes, money links the present with the future, but possesses only exchange value. In a word, money is neutral, unless money supply is mismanaged. Thus a central bank is credible only if it follows the same rule. The implication is that the system is cyclically and softly unstable. Monetarists rely on rules, Keynes on discretionary policies.

Monetarist Behavior of Economic and Political Agents
Risk (a known and calculated uncertainty) takes the explanatory place of uncertainty. Monetarists also return to the concept of homus economicus. There is homogeneity in individual desires, expectations, behaviours and criteria. As a consequence, adaptive expectations exist, although expectations are rarely irrational, as determinism exists in behaviours in the midst of perfect information by private agents. The future is an extension of the past and is fully anticipatable, wherein agents choose the best feasible option given their knowledge and their means. Individual optimization is thus a realistic assumption.

In other words, structures and units act coordinately, so that no market dichotomies or typologies or either dichotomist behaviour exist. Hence variables are symmetric and flexible, since rational agents take real, sequential and independent decisions. This is in open contrast to Keynes’s theory. The practical consequence of these statements is that most variables are actually parameters or either lagged or intertemporary variables. In a sense aggregate private relations lack independent existence, as all activities are independent and interrelations are simple.

5. The Hard Core of the Neoclassical Synthesis
The Neoclassical Synthesis (NS) was initiated by the writings of Hicks (1937), Samuelson (1947) and Hansen (1953). It is mainly comprised by Franco Modigliani, Seymour Harris, Lawrence Klein, James Tobin, James Duesenberry, Robert Solow, Robert Mundell, and Robert Eisner. It reigned during the 1950s and the 1960s, but was superseded when developments in the real economies generated by the financial system made NS irrelevant or obsolete, because money only had a secondary relevance in their analyses. Since 1936, all economies are considered to be monetary.

Neoclassical Synthesis Definitions, Objectives and Means
The system has the ability to self-regulate whenever proper actions are taken, although deviations from equilibria are the exception in a relatively organized universe. Therefore the analysis combines planned, welfare and free-market positions. NS is therefore a conciliatory position between free markets and state intervention, where micro and macroeconomics may cohabit. Thus the aim is to re-establish the relevance of Neo Classical microeconomics whenever the economy is at the full employment level, providing more relevance to microeconomic problems than Keynes. The objective is thus the achievement of both social and individual objectives.

The role of macroeconomics is thus the stabilization of activity as well as both absolute and relative prices by means of the determination of the levels of Y (Income) and r (Interest rate), as well as by the identification of the impact of these variables on the system. The means is the analysis of the constituents of both AD and AS (Aggregate Supply). NS hence revises orthodox theories and synthesizes them, framing Keynes’s analysis into the Neo Classical tradition, “proving” that Keynes’ formulations are a special case of their theory. In other words, in this view Keynes’s analysis only contributes specific -but key- insights.

Neoclassical Synthesis Methodology
In the same way as Keynes, this analysis disentangles positive from normative economics. Further, NS considers that social and exact sciences differ, since the former is determined by historical events and possess different formulation and interpretation processes. On the other hand, theories must provide practical answers to real problems. In this context there are two ways to construct theories in social sciences: by generalizing abstractions and then using the deductive method; and alternatively analyzing historical sources. Finally, this school uses the concepts of ‘logical time’ and ‘certainty’. However ‘uncertainty’ is at the core of Keynes’s vision. Strangely enough, Patinkin defendd Hick’s IS-LM model as a legitimate tool for teaching macroeconomics.

Theories must be selective and evolutionary so that the analysis preaches a dynamic methodology. A new paradigm emerges whenever theories contribute a new form to identify problems, a new theory to resolve problems or a new approach to be developed. The process is eclectic and empirical as conclusions are not drawn by deducting theories from their formulations, but by means of contrasting observed facts.

The use of assumptions is a matter of degree. The standpoints typically found are: methodological nominalism, determined by behaviours rather than natures; pattern modeling; identification of the positions of facts within a system; apriorism; empiricism; falsificationism and verificationism. Finally, its methodological question differs from that of Keynes’s. This is: how activities may be co-ordinate in reality, albeit no one attempts to ensure that result? Obviously different initial questions, lead to the use of different methods and models and hence to dissimilar results.

Neoclassical Synthesis Institutions
The private sector stabilizes activity in co-ordination with the public sector although fear of crowding out is pervasive. As in Monetarism, investors are rational and follow the principle of maximization with adaptive expectations. Likewise, the analysis respects social and political institutions -especially money. This is related to the thinking that money and monetary variables possess a conventional role and it is neutral as in the Classical Theory (except in turbulent periods), leaving room for fiscal policy. In fact money rarely possesses both exchange and use values.

Neoclassical Synthesis Behavior of Economic and Political Agents
In essence this category is the same as in the Monetarist analysis, especially about the role of expectations and the relevance of inter-temporary decisions. On the other hand, the analysis possesses an atomistic vision of agents in terms of core, but accepts the organicist view in the analysis of aggregate variables. Finally the consideration of adaptive expectations leads to the ubiquitous implementation of lagged models as the future is an extension of the past, based on the insight that uncertainty is the exception. Examples of lagged models are those undertaken in such refinements of the consumption (Ct-1) and investment functions (It-1)​[4]​ with weighting parameters such as λ.

6. The hard core of New Classical Macroeconomics
Outstanding members of the school called New Classical Macroeconomics (RE) are Robert Lucas, Thomas Sargent and Robert Barro, mainly prevailing during the 1980s. This SRP is based on the core and operating principle of Rational Expectations (RE), first proposed by John F. Muth (Muth, 1953), and its main implication is the futility of the implementation of anticipated policies, considering that the system is able to self-regulate. The principle of RE means that agents are rational in the sense that deviations from the average offset each other, where expectations refer to foresights on macroeconomic variables. RE is influential in terms of particular insights, especially on the issues of behaviour and prediction in econometric models.

New Classical Macroeconomics System, Definitions, Objectives and
Means
This analysis is mechanicist, since it assumes that the system self-regulates. The system is hence, stable, as deviations from full employment are the exception. Therefore this perspective assumes away the existence of individual freedom, perfect information and rationality. The relevant role pertains to the private sector, assuming perfect markets, corporate and financial systems, which generate efficiency in variables adjustment. As a consequence, RE conducts research about the role of policies, thereby reviving Keynes’s message that expectations are the shaping factor. The basis is the Hypothesis of Rational Expectations (HRE): expectations are based on available information on both historical and future facts.

Hence variables only respond to changes in policies, which have not been anticipated by individuals. The implication is that deviations from equilibria on the part of AD are exceptional. Normally all markets are free and quickly adjust as all information is included in prices, wherein agents anticipate both the effects and changes generated by systematic policies. Thus useless stabilization policies in the short term reject the ‘stabilization’ concept. As only the non-systematic parts of policies affect variables, the goal is the stabilization of both the economic activity and the price level using Ms management and relative prices when considering shocks in AS. Just like in Monetarism, disturbances are exogenous.

In this context, the theory applies classical economics to macroeconomics bringing consistency to optimization, by revising both Keynesianism and Monetarism. The final objective is the achievement of individual welfare, which automatically brings about social welfare.

New Classical Macroeconomics Methodology
RE is allegedly an axiom, which resolves the inconsistency between empirical and theoretical macroeconomics. Its methodological posture is atomistic and individualistic (unlike the Keynesian) and pragmatic (ex-post). However it is initially aprioristic (unlike the Monetarists) since rationality, its main operating principle, is stated a priori. It is thus a mental construction, not necessarily confirmed by reality. On the other hand, the principle of rationality possesses high operationality, both in analytical and empirical terms.

Otherwise, this analysis is identical to the Monetarist school. It relies on the observation of “real” facts, then analyses them and deducts conclusions, contrasting them with reality. It is falsificationist since the methodology used is dynamic by improving its models through continuous research. For this purpose it uses an instrumentalist approach.

New Classical Macroeconomics Institutions
This analysis, unlike Keynes’s and the Monetarist, does not break with current institutions. As in the latter, the State must only conduct surveillance activities. Money is neutral (unless mismanaged) and expectations are rational. Accordingly, the economic system is only sensitive to either policy expectations or supply shocks.

New Classical Macroeconomics Behavior of Economic and Political Agents
Individual actions are homogeneous so that average behaviors and rationality prevail. Furthermore agents’ behaviour is persistent. This is related to the idea that individuals possess perfect information about past and present events, and process it in an efficient manner. Individuals do not take decisions based on historical processes or under the assumption that times do change. Hence the future is the result of rational foresight. Unlike in Keynes, certainty exists. In operational terms due to rationality, aggregate relations are not timely fixed, but possess real existence like in Keynes. A cornerstone of this analysis is the relevance of the surprise supply function (cf. Lucas, 1972), which means that only irrational agents, and for short spans of time, may be fooled.

The system can be represented in terms of either a model of continuous equilibria or a model of general equilibrium due to the homogeneity in behaviours and speed of market adjustment, since RE challenges the Keynesian assumption of market diversity. Consequently, this analysis improves the models of general equilibrium in terms of their inter-temporality assumption, replacing the auctioneer with perfect rationality.

7. The Hard Core of General Disequilibrium
This school is also known as the Walrasian-Keynesian Synthesis or Post Walrasianism (GD). The "disequilibrium" approach to Keynesian theory is associated with the research of Robert Clower (1965), Axel Leijonhufvud (1967, 1968), Robert J. Barro and Herschel Grossman (1971, 1976) as well as Malinvaud and Benassy on the European continent. It had a brief but brilliant life in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The center of the attacks of GD is the Walrasian Law, much as Say’s Law was attacked by Keynes. It states that the addition of all exceeding demands and supplies must immediately equal zero, where the labour (n-1) and money markets (n) receive a special treatment like in Keynes.

General Disequilibrium: System, Definition, Objectives and Means
The system is complex as its interrelations are complicated and non linear. This analysis synthesizes the Keynesian and the Walrasian theories, explaining macroeconomic problems from the approach of persistent disequilibrium, where the system is able to self regulate. For that purpose this school uses the concepts of ‘logical time’ and ‘path-dependence events’. The goal is to deepen Keynes’s insights in terms of the path to equilibrium, which is static and discrete for him. Conclusions are drawn from the basic assumption that agents’ exchanges occur at moments of disequilibrium. The implications are that adjustment “must” be fast and traceable.

Actually the system is in permanent disequilibrium due to the slowness in its adjustment mechanisms, which depend on relative prices and aggregate quantity of goods. Hence market disequilibria occur at each and every moment, thereby diverting the system from full employment.

The objective is thus to explain the existence of involuntary unemployment and business fluctuations as well as the transition phases in variables. A secondary objective is the examination of the difference between the GD analysis and those of Keynes and the Neo Walrasians. Therefore this paradigm can be seen as a theory of unemployment in the context of an effective demand constraint in a general equilibrium context. 

Unemployment is the normal state and a non-Walrasian Keynesian explanation is required, recalling that the Walrasian model is linear, homogeneous and unidirectional. There are goal variables such as unemployment (U) and national income (Y), and instrumental variables, all of which are used in Keynes’s analysis, in addition to the tool of the Dual Hypothesis related to the labor market.

The concept of theoretical demand is related to the Walrasian idea of planned demand, whereas the concept of effective demand is the basic heuristic idea in Keynes. For the GD the distinction between these two concepts is due to individuals take decisions in two stages. Planned consumption, saving and labor supply in the current period are labeled by Clower as theoretical demand and supply. Involuntary unemployment means that theoretical demand and supply are not realized. Consequently, Keynes’s concept of effective demand faces an additional constraint and this motivates GD to conduct research about the functioning of labor, money and goods markets in terms of their dynamic and transitional properties.

General Disequilibrium: Methodology
Unlike the Walrasian models, GD celebrates the Keynesian interest on active policies. It is eclectic as it deducts conclusions and synthesizes several methods to display its hypotheses, but its main methodological objective is to structure its hypotheses in theoretical terms. 

Even more important is its methodological question: how does the system function? Keynes would have replied that the system is inherently inefficient, albeit policies can be used to achieve efficiency. Nevertheless GD states that failures in the self-regulation ability of the system must be accepted and neutralized as its dynamics may be analyzed to explain its essence rather than simply be corrected. This is thus a school centered on essentialism. Not only is destiny relevant but also the chosen road, as disturbances are inherent to the system.

General Disequilibrium: Institutions
This analysis does not break with economic, political or social institutions or even property rights, as it only explains the functioning of the macroeconomic system. The State plays the same role as in Keynes: it regulates the functioning of the system and corrects structural problems. GD remarkably uses the concept of ‘logical time’ with an organicist perspective, implying that the system is path-dependent. Money is a specific institution, key to the adjustment of the system, possessing a specific market. Labour market is also different as men are not merchandise and have the power of decision. Thus money and labour differ from other goods making the system monetary, unstable and dynamic, unlike in the models of General Equilibrium.

General Disequilibrium: Behavior of Economic and Political Agents
This analysis assumes not only heterogeneity in agents’ expectations but also speed asymmetry in the functioning of markets (in terms of time rather than space as in Keynes). It also assumes uncertainty as both mixed expectations and irrational behaviours are ubiquitous in the system, like in Keynes. This school is however specialized in the analysis of the consequences of disequilibria. According to GD, disequilibrium would nevertheless persist even under rational expectations. The reason is that decisions are taken at different moments and under different scenarios. No auctioneer exists, unlike in the Walrasian analysis.

In addition, individuals base their opinions on experience rather than on their uncertain knowledge of future, unlike in Keynes. On the other hand, beliefs, traditions and technology are untouched like in Keynes’s analysis.

8. Conclusion: A Comprehensive Analysis of the Former Scientific Research Programmes
Adopting theories without a revision of their cores is a mistake. This statement justifies this test of the validity of Keynes’s economics by means of the comparisons of all the mentioned SRPs, especially in terms of the philosophical differences between them. Thse differences are summarized in Table 2.

Table 2 Main characteristics of the Cores of the Studied Schools

School	The system, definitions,objectives & means (metaphysics and teleology)	Methodology (philosophy of science)	Institutions (political and institutional philosophy)	Behaviour of political & economic agents (philosophy of science)
Keynes	A non self-regulating system requires an analysis of Y determination and the solution of involuntary U. Disturbances are endogenous and underemployment shifting equilibria exist.	Organicism, theory + praxis. Historical time and non-ergodicity. Intuition and conventions are relevant. Dynamic observation.  Soft Verificationism. A complex system in spatial terms.	Money is non-neutral generating uncertainty. The State must lead activity and implement discretionary policies to correct demand deficiencies.	Uncertain expectations and heterogeneous agents. Animal spirits in investment and the fluctuating element in AD.
Moneta-rism 	A self-regulating system, where disturbances are both exogenous and exceptional, and generate 	Atomism, logical time and non-ergodicity. Falsificationism. Cartesianism.Leibizianism.	Money is neutral and intertemporary. Laissez-faire. The private sector must lead activity. The government must implement rules to correct exceptional deficiencies in effective demand.	Certainty and homogeneity in agents. Adaptive expectations.
Neo-classical Synthesis	An imperfect self-regulating system requires an analysis of Y determination and the solution of U. Equilibrium is something to be gained.	Atomism and organicism cohabit. Logical time and non-ergodicity prevail in microeconomics but only in turbulent periods.	Money may be neutral and intertempo-rary. The State must co-operate in activity and must implement corrective policies to nullify deficiencies in effective demand.	Certainty and adaptive expectations. Heterogeneous agents exist in the macro-economy.
New Classical Macro-economics (RE)	A self-regulating system exists, where disturbances are exogenous and generate either U or .	Apriorism, atomism, logical time and ergodicity. A system with simple interrelations.	Money is neutral. Laissez-faire. The private sector must lead activity. The government must implement surprising policies to correct exceptional deficiencies in AD.	Certainty and homogeneity in agents exist as well as rational expectations, and perfect and symmetric information.
General Disequi-librium	A temporary but recurring non self-regulating system requires an analysis of Y determination and the study of U. Disturbances are endogenous and temporary.	Essentialism and functionalism. Logical time. A complex system in terms of timing. Processes are relevant.	Money and labour markets are different. They are temporarily uncertain and affect AD.	Heterogeneity in markets and agents (men have power of decision). Imperfect information in terms of timing. Information lags. 

At a first glance, the SRPs of these four orthodox Post Keynesian schools may be dubbed as a soft kind of Keynesianism, mainly in terms of their consideration of the ability of the system to self regulate as reflected in their views on unemployment and policy management. They may also be summarized as a consideration of rigidities and flexibilities rather than of system uncertainty. Where then is Keynes’s message? 

Further, these schools seem to be involved in theoretical inconsistencies and ambiguities, such as NS in the consideration of organicism and atomism at the same time without an adequate philosophical justification. They cannot stand empirical refutations. Monetarism, New Classical Macroeconomics or the Neoclassical Synthesis do not explain current events, as they somehow neglect the growing relevance of expectations on financial systems.

Even more importantly, since the basic Keynes’s questions, analytical tools and methods are the hidden bases of the so-called Orthodox Post Keynesian schools, it can be concluded that Keynes’s core has not been replaced. When these four schools are seen as whole, the conclusion is that Keynes’s SRP is alive in terms of its core. Keynes’s SRP has only experienced slight changes, mainly in its Protective Belt. That is, these schools represent scientific movements from Keynes and they are degenerative since they do not bring about scientific theoretical or empricial progress, except by isolated insights. 

At best, MS and RE might represent independent subSRP’s of that of Keynes, but they are dependent on the Classical school because of their belief in the existence of a self-regulating system. They have not changed however, the essence of macroeconomics.

Keynes believed in the existence of a unique (but undetermined and shifting) equilibrium, which does not necessarily occur at the full employment level. He thus proposed a method to correct system failures, revolutionizing economics by money and uncertainty at the center of aggregate problems, such as abrupt fluctuations in business cycles.

Nevertheless there is an explicit belief in orthodoxy that MS and NS have also revolutionized macroeconomics, although they state that the system has the ability for self-regulation. This and similar statements were hereby be assessed by conducting the Internal History of Keynes’s SRP and contrasting his SRP with those of the other four schools. In this respect the new SRP mainly represented by the emergence of TGT was modified according to the results of this article only in external terms on the part of both NS and MS, since as previously mentioned their cores return to certainty, money neutrality and Laissez Faire. Accordingly MS is a SubSRP of Keynes’s SRP, whereas NS is a Progressive Scientific Movement of Keynes’s SRP. 

Consensus is that these four schools are innovative, except General Disequilibrium school which departs from the critique of general equilibrium theory. They are characterized by the acceptance of the IS-LM diagram, a reliance on the efficiency of wages and prices to regulate the system and the use of the Phillips Curve, in the case of the Neoclassical Synthesis. This refers however to positive heuristics and not to core replacement.

According to Table 2, apart from the contribution of historical and social processes to the study of the static economy and its ubiquitous intermediate position, NS does not contribute a new core. It considers Keynes’s theories a “special” case by only changing its positive heuristics and protective belt. However, it only modifies the assumptions on both investment and money demand. It adds theoretical and empirical heuristics, such as the Consumption Function of Modigliani and support for the use of fiscal policy. NS seems to be as an extension of Keynes’s model under a Lakatosian perspective, since only some of its heuristics differs. Other parts of NS methods are similar to those of the Neo Classical School. Moreover NS is similar in some heuristic positions to those of Keynes’s Circus, taking elements from such classical economists as Pigou.

MS SRP is different from that of Keynes in its vision about individual freedom and non-animal behaviour. However, its theory is in such a way opposed to Keynes’s core that it seems to be inspired in Keynes himself in order to return to the Classical perfect world. Its positive and instrumentalist methodology breaks some parts of Keynes’s core, contributing pragmatic elements to income determination theory, and therefore celebrating Keynes’s message. Like NS, MS analyses macroeconomics is based on the study of Aggregate Demand. MS however, seems rigid as well as only suitable for developed economies.

The Monetarists revive the Quantity Theory of Money, considering that money is neutral in the long term. Summarizing, they contribute a new positive methodology, epitomized by Friedman´s emphasis on prediction (see Friedman, 1953). This however, is not sufficient to initiate a new SRP. 

The RE school is only a more elegant, dynamic and flexible version of Monetarism. RE includes in its core the innovative methodological concept of ‘Aprioristic Rationality’, which has to falsify reality. Nevertheless, RE methodology is instrumentalist not realist as in Keynes. It also assumes homogeneity in behaviours and its objectives are identical to those aimed by the Monetarists: inflation. For these reasons and since it also assumes the existence of a self-regulated system, RE can be considered as a Scientific Movement or a Subprogram of Monetarism. RE nevertheless, contributes new empirical content to macroeconomics, denying the role of policies, because only a surprise element would make monetary policy have an impact on income.

Whereas GD is an exaggerated dynamic Keynesianism, it is basically a heuristic analysis. No new methodology, objectives or agents’ behaviour are provided by this explanation. Perhaps, both Keynes and GD arise in part from the poor contribution of results on the part of the General Equilibrium model. GD however, partly modifies the Keynesian message by reverting to the original question about the functioning of the system, but its reply is more dynamic. In addition this school has only undertaken ad-hoc changes or created new PHs with respect to Keynes. GD is hence, a sub-Scientific Program of Keynes’s SRP. They are Post Walrasians using some of Keynes’s insights. If NS is the hydraulic version of Keynes’s economics, GD is the thermodynamic interpretation of Keynes’s vision.

Final Remarks
Keynes’s SRP is the essence of static macroeconomics which is different from Keynesian theories, a statement firstly expressed by Leijonhuvfud (Leijonhuvfud, 1967, 1968). It is progressive in both theoretical and empirical terms, and is still the yardstick for measuring macro-phenomena. Keynes was not focused on prescribing the problems of the Great Depression or of inflation (cf. Keynes, 1937b). Actually, his perspective of a non self-regulated universe is a milestone in science. 

On the surface the four studied schools seem faithful to the original Keynes’s message, but it was somehow either betrayed or misunderstood by them because Keynes’s core has not been replaced and some member of orthodox schools do not acknowledge his parenthood. Keynes has not been appropriately followed by orthodox schools.

The Keynesian chain (a non self-regulated system, the non-neutrality of money, his organicism and uncertainty) is misunderstood and misapplied by these so-called “bastard” schools, to quote Joan Robinson (Robinson, 1975[1973], 125). The deviation of these schools from Keynes is also confirmed by the futility of their search for the micro-foundations of macroeconomics, as organicism is relevant in societies and also observed in nature.

Leijohnhuvfud (1967) talked about a truce between the Neoclassicals and the Keynesian orthodox. A truce confirms the existence of a former rift. This analysis in turn confirms that Keynes removed the Walrasian Deus Ex Machina: The auctioneer. It can be concluded that Keynes’s case is more relevant to the real world. As the last world crises have confirmed, the weakness of macroeconomics lays on deviations on the part of Keynesian orthodox thought concerning behaviour under certainty (see Chapter 12 of TGT) and hence on the role of money. 

A final word on the subject of active participants in the Keynes versus the Classics (and their modern versions) debate since the 1950s can be expressed. Neoliberals and modern members of the mentioned four schools (for example, Mankiw or Lucas) will contend loss of meaning or deviations from the original Keynes’s legacy. For explicit dissenting views from the type of conclusions expressed in this article on the reception of Keynes’s legacy by modern economists, see Snowdon and Vane (1999) and Blaug (1990) in these references, who undertook interviews with leading economists about Keynes’s legacy. 

Both modern and past articles and books on Keynes and his immediate orthodoxy were utilized in this analysis, and the Lakatosian perspective was used in order to avoid undertaking either historical or plain speculative analyses on the past and the future of Keynes’s SRP.
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